



Is America safer today? The first changes to U.S. foreign and security 
policy during the presidency of Donald Trump
Abstract: This article describes the first months of Donald Trump’s presidency. It presents his most 
important decisions on U.S. foreign and security policy, the voices of those critical and supportive of 
him, and possible implications for U.S. security. Even during his election campaign, some of Trump’s 
proposals raised concerns among the international community and many questions about past alliances. 
He has announced the introduction of laws for the immediate removal of illegal immigrants from the 
United States, and the reintroduction of torture as a tool for fighting terrorism. He has criticized the cur-
rent policy of cooperation with allies, and the provision of security to other countries at the expense of 
the United States. The decisions made during Donald Trump’s first 100 days affect the internal situation 
of the United States, both in the context of national security and the political system, due to the emerg-
ing constitutional crisis and the friction between the executive and the judiciary branches. His decisions 
also affect relations between the United States and its allies, transforming America’s role in the world 
and the impact of the superpower on the collective system of security.
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Introduction
Even during his election campaign, the republican candidate for president of the Unit-ed States proposed changes in foreign and security policy that caused anxiety among 
the international community and raised many questions about existing alliances and the 
functioning of the collective security system. Donald Trump, among others, announced 
that he would call for the immediate deportation of illegal immigrants from the U.S., for 
the restoration of the use of torture against terrorists, for the renegotiation of relations 
with Russia and closer cooperation in the fight against terrorism in the Middle East, and 
the construction of a wall on the border with Mexico. He undermined current policies of 
cooperation with allies, challenged the policy of providing security to other countries at 
the expense of the United States, and even played with the idea of the U.S. eventually 
withdrawing their support for South Korea and Japan, which would have far-reaching 
consequences for the international order.
Although the announcements themselves may have caused some anxiety, it was 
assumed that the election campaign was governed by rules entirely different from 
those used for the actual governance of the state and the hope was that the candi-
date’s promises would never be put into action. However, the decisions taken by the 
president during the first 100 days in office may indicate that Donald Trump intends 
to carry out his campaign promises. In the first week of his presidency, Trump signed 
a series of executive orders that put into effect the radical announcements of his elec-
tion campaign.
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The purpose of this article is to present the first series of changes made by president 
Trump in foreign and security policy, and to analyze possible repercussions, as well as 
to show the opinions of supporters and critics. The analysis will serve to answer the fol-
lowing questions: what changes in foreign and security policy does Donald Trump wish 
to introduce? Will the proposed changes strengthen U.S. security? What will Trump’s 
doctrine be? What implications for U.S. relations with other states will the changes in 
legislation bring about?
The role and position of the president in U.S. foreign and security policy  
– theoretical aspects
The influence and role of the U.S. president in creating foreign and security policy 
is superior to that of other organs of public authority. This is mainly due to the specifics 
of the presidential system and the U.S. Constitution, which assigns him a wide range of 
power as chief executive. It is worth noting that the U.S. Constitution details the powers 
of Congress in detail. This is not the case for the function and position of the president, 
where the wording is very general, leaving a wide field for arbitrary interpretation, which 
is the starting point for extending the capabilities and power of the president (Dziemi-
dok-Olszewska, 2009, p. 154 et seq). Thus, the president of the United States has quite 
a diverse role as a symbol of the state and the people of the United States, as the head 
of the armed forces, chief of diplomacy, leader of the party, chief executive, national 
spokesman, promoter of economic development and world leader (Amos, Jordan, Tay-
lor, Meese, Nielsen, Schlesinger, 2009, p. 77). As some researchers point out, the broad 
powers conferred on the president make him the most important actor in U.S. foreign and 
security policy (Ulrich, 2012, p. 63).
While serving as head of state and head of government, the U.S. president is respon-
sible for the preparation and implementation of the budget, nominating powers (e.g. 
the nomination of the secretary of state) and the administrative activities of overseeing 
the cabinet, agencies and executive committees (Wordliczek, 2003, pp. 96–118). Such 
strong power in the presidential system carries the risk of abuse. Thus, a braking mecha-
nism is needed, which in the U.S. is the principle of checks and balances between the 
executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government (Hill, 2001, p. 43). In the 
context of foreign and security policy, Congress carries out their control function by 
accepting presidential nominations or receiving reports on the activities of government 
agencies (Waśko-Owsiejczuk, 2014, p. 87). However, the most important element of 
control the legislative body has over the executive body is the right to declare war and 
to allocate a budget for it, which is the responsibility of Congress and not the president 
(Michałek, 2005, pp. 65–66).
In order to implement foreign and security policy, the president is equipped with im-
portant tools, including executive orders and presidential directives. Executive orders, 
which do not require congressional approval, are usually directed at federal agencies. 
Often these are important decisions that cause changes in American legislation. Presi-
dential directives are also an important security policy instrument. Although signed or 
endorsed by the president of the United States, this document is usually handled by the 
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National Security Council. Presidential directives are often secret and, although they 
are usually targeted at specific government agencies, their scope includes the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of the federal government, as well as state and local 
governments (Waśko-Owsiejczuk, 2014, p. 58).
Apart from the legal position of the president in shaping foreign and security policy, 
non-constitutional factors also play a role, such as the personality of a given president, 
his skills and style of governance, and the situational context in which leadership is exer-
cised (Antoszewski, 2014, p. 23). President Harry Truman’s assistant, Richard Neustadt, 
once said: “Americans like to judge their leader not in terms of competence or incompe-
tence, but in terms of strength or weakness” (see: Czulda, 2010, p. 60). The personality 
characteristics and predispositions that one should have in order to function effectively 
as the head of a superpower include strength, courage and confidence. Less important 
is competence, or whether the candidate in question is an economics or foreign policy 
expert, since he is assisted by a wide circle of trusted associates. This must be a strong 
leader who cares for citizens’ security and the development of the country. The president 
of a superpower should also have charisma and be a good speaker, thus exciting his lis-
teners (Waldman, 2000, p. 105). What is more important than political correctness are at-
tributes such as decisiveness and firmness in the leader of the most powerful state in the 
world (Ludwikowski, Ludwikowska, 2009, pp. 122–123). There is even a concept called 
the imperial presidency, referring to the position and function of the U.S. president. 
Here, it is understood that the president is seen as almost predestined to be the leader 
of an international empire (Shafritz, 1993, pp. 378–379). Americans are able to forgive 
their president many things, but not weakness and the inability to exercise power.
The external environment plays an important role in the process of shaping foreign 
and security policy. The political parties and Congress can be either a partner or oppo-
nent to the president. The media, public opinion, interest groups, and the international 
community (see: Amos, Jordan, Taylor, Meese, Nielsen, Schlesinger, 2009, p. 77) can 
all exert pressure, thus influencing the decision-making process of the White House. 
Another important group is the National Security Council, whose main purpose is to 
advise the U.S. president on state security, taking into account internal, national, foreign 
and military policies. This group includes the vice president, the secretary of state, the 
treasury secretary, the defense secretary and the president’s national security adviser 
(Shafritz, 1993, p. 317; Best, 2011, p. 1 et seq).
The unique (privileged) position of the United States in the international system also 
has influence on the role and position of the president in foreign and security policy. 
Since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States 
has become a superpower1 with a dominant role in the international system.2 Two fac-
tors – military and political – play a crucial role here. U.S. defense expenditure accounts 
for nearly 50% of global defense spending (Roser, Nagdy, 2017). Its enormous military 
1 Power in foreign policy refers to states that can decide on world war and peace, have global in-
terests, and determine the world order. The strength of the state is understood as the real and potential 
ability to use all its assets and liabilities to achieve goals and meet their needs in an international envi-
ronment (see more: Włodkowska, 2004, pp. 163–170; Włodkowska-Bagan, pp. 199–202).
2 The international system consists of elements (participants), related to each other (see more: 
Pawłuszko, 2014, pp. 9–28).
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potential and modern military technology provide the United States with a dominant 
international position. Americans want to maintain their status as the most powerful 
military in the world not only to deter potential enemies from attacking the U.S., but also 
to enable military action in almost every region of the world. The military potential of 
the superpower is so large that it is the only state in the world which has armed forces 
capable of carrying out military operations on a global scale. According to the doctrine 
of two and a half wars, the superpower can simultaneously carry out two wars and one 
conflict in any part of the world (Balcerowicz, 2010, pp. 74–77).
Equally important is the political factor. The power of the United States is also mani-
fested through its role and position in international organizations. It is difficult to imag-
ine the functioning and smooth operation of organizations without U.S. involvement, 
especially those that originated from their own initiative, such as the UN, NATO and 
NAFTA. The strength of the position of the U.S. on the international stage can be ob-
served not only through records and regulations, or through its permanent membership 
on the UN Security Council, but also through the actions of the superpower. For exam-
ple, one of its actions was the unlawful invasion of Iraq in March 2003, despite criti-
cism and opposition from the international community, including most of the members 
of the UN Security Council. The actions of the United Nations after the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq were also important in showing the strength of the position of the U.S. in the 
international system. Not only did the United States face no consequences, but the UN 
called on other states to support the efforts of the U.S. coalition to rebuild Iraq (Waśko-
Owsiejczuk, 2016b, pp. 133–153). As it turned out, the UN was completely helpless 
against the unlawful actions of its strongest member.
The dominant position of the U.S. in the world, coupled with the strong position 
of the president in a presidential system of government, not only makes the role of the 
leader of the superpower superior in creating foreign and security policy, but is of crucial 
importance for the whole international system. Thus, the decisions and actions of the 
U.S. president have a significant impact and implications not only on the internal secu-
rity of the country, but also on the other participants of international relations.
What will Trump’s doctrine be?
After Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 45th president of the United States, a short 
note appeared on the White House website, highlighting the main foreign policy goals of 
the new administration, which included: peace through strength; defeat of radical Islam-
ist terrorist groups, using aggressive coalition operations if necessary; the liquidation of 
the sources of income for terrorists; the rebuilding and enlargement of the U.S. military; 
the construction of a modern missile defense system; renegotiation or withdrawal from 
NAFTA (America First Foreign Policy, 2017).
This short message cannot even be called an outline of the White House conception 
for U.S. foreign policy, it is rather a duplication of the election slogans without the provi-
sion of any details. Trump’s foreign policy vision was not precisely defined during the 
election campaign, nor was it clarified in the first few months of his presidency. Unlike 
the administration of his predecessors – Barack Obama and George W. Bush, who had 
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clearly defined goals and successively realized them, the Trump administration is hav-
ing problems in defining a coherent foreign and security policy. The biggest discrepan-
cies are between the president and a group of his closest advisers, with the exception of 
the dismissed national security adviser, Michael Flynn, whose views can be considered 
consistent with Trump’s. President Trump’s position varies with that of defense secre-
tary – James Mattis, who has repeatedly emphasized the threat posed by Russia and the 
inviolability of U.S. alliances, has called Putin “delusional” for breaking all the rules 
of international diplomacy, and has claimed that among the world’s threats “the most 
dangerous might be Russia” (Scarborough, 2016). A similar point of view is held by 
vice president – Mike Pence, secretary of state – Rex Tillerson, and the newly appointed 
national security advisor to the president – Herbert McMaster. The president’s position 
on U.S.-Russian relations is significantly different from his advisers. Even during his 
election campaign, he announced his desire to cooperate with Russia in the fight against 
the terrorist organization called the “Islamic State” (Donald Trump), and his wish to im-
prove relations between Washington and Moscow, expressing great respect and sympa-
thy for president Putin (Pengelly, 2017). In turn, Trump’s associates criticized Russia for 
violating international law, for its aggressive and destabilizing actions, and emphasized 
the inability of the United States to engage in military cooperation with Russia. They 
expressed their deep skepticism over Russia’s ability to comply with its earlier commit-
ments to the United States, and over the actual intentions of Russia in Syria, where more 
than 80 percent of Russian raids were directed against rebels fighting the Assad regime 
and not jihadists (Masters, 2017; Shinkman, 2017).
Trump’s pro-Russian stance could be considered a solid point in his conception of 
U.S. foreign policy if not for the recent commentary by the U.S. president, where he crit-
icized Russia’s seizure of Crimea, asking whether former U.S. president Barack Obama 
was too mild towards Russia in the context of these events. This commentary is quite 
surprising, since during his campaign Trump declared that Ukraine mattered the least to 
the United States out of all of the NATO countries, and the solution to this problem and 
the burden of responsibility should not belong to the U.S. (LoBianco, 2015). Of course, 
it cannot be ruled out that the colder attitude towards Moscow is due to recent events, 
which were heavily covered by the media, namely the the resignation of national security 
presidential advisor Michael Flynn, who lied about having contact with Russia before 
Donald Trump took over the presidency (see: Haberman, Rosenberg, Apuzzo, Thrushf, 
2017).
Similar divergences and contradictory signals can be seen in Trump’s election state-
ments in the context of NATO and in the statements of his administration, especially 
comments made by the secretary of defense. During his campaign, Trump claimed that 
the North Atlantic Alliance was outdated, criticized the excessive involvement of the 
U.S. in NATO, even though this alliance has been the basis of Western security policy 
since the Cold War. He announced a reduction on spending on NATO, and a desire to 
focus on internal affairs (Sanger, Haberman, 2016), which sent a signal to other nations 
that the United States would not be the “world’s policeman” under Trump’s rule. He 
weakened the guarantee of the provision of international security by the U.S., making 
it dependent on the ability of individual countries to fulfill their financial commitments 
to the Alliance. It now seemed that a U.S. response to possible aggression towards other 
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NATO members depended on the country’s regulation of financial dues, according to the 
principle: “If you pay we will defend you, otherwise you are on your own.” The secretary 
of defense for the Trump administration issued a very different declaration, where he 
confirmed the commitment of the United States to engage in the North Atlantic Alliance 
as a loyal ally (Brook, 2017). He also expressed the view that Vladimir Putin was trying 
to destroy the alliance between the U.S. and Europe, with the hope of breaking up NATO 
(Ackerman, Gambino, 2017).
Donald Trump’s speeches and statements on foreign policy raise many doubts and 
questions, including whether the U.S. will continue to guarantee international order and 
whether NATO members can count on the help of America when faced with aggression. 
What will the relationship between Brussels and Washington be like for the next four 
years? Trump’s win was not met with much enthusiasm in the European Union. Out of 
all EU leaders, only Italian Prime Minister – Matteo Renzi publically supported Hillary 
Clinton, but privately an overwhelming majority of EU rulers sided with her in the elec-
tion. Only a minority of EU leaders sided with Trump, which should not be surprising, 
given the critical remarks made by the republican candidate about the European Union, 
where he wished its quick disbandment. Trump did not hide his support for Brexit in the 
UK, saying that the European Union was on the verge of collapse, and urged other mem-
ber states to follow suit (Stewart, Yuhas, Walker, 2017). Trump’s enthusiasm was not 
shared by other politicians, and not just in the European Union. United States Ambas-
sador to the European Union, Anthony L. Gardner, stated: “To think that by supporting 
fragmentation of Europe we would be advancing our interests would be sheer folly. It’s 
lunacy” (Dominiczak, 2017).
It is not only Europe that is concerned about the direction of foreign policy of the 
superpower. The neighbors of the U.S. are also concerned. The more so, in that Trump’s 
statements indicate major changes in the North American Free Trade Agreement, which 
he termed “the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere” (see: Withnall, 2017). 
Mexican authorities are rebelling against Trump’s announcement of building 1,000 miles 
of a border wall between the countries, for which Mexico is to pay for. An additional 
regression in relations between the two countries has been prompted by the introduction 
of a 20% tax on the import of goods from Mexico (Jacobs, Rushe, Agren, 2017).
Relations between Washington and Beijing are also unclear. During his campaign, 
Trump threatened to introduce higher customs tariffs if the Chinese government refused 
to renegotiate the trade deals that existed between the two countries. At the same time, 
he announced an increase in U.S. military presence in the South Sea, which would pre-
vent China’s territorial expansion in the artificial islands there. Much concern was also 
caused by the announcement that Trump wishes to break the nuclear deal with Iran, or 
force an eventual renegotiation, to which Trump wants to force onto Iranian authorities 
by doubling, or even tripling, sanctions. He has threatened to withdraw the U.S. from 
the World Trade Organization and the International Agreement on Combating Climate 
Change. Concerns were also raised about his declaration to restore torture as an effec-
tive tool in the fight against terrorism (Fisher, 2016). Trump also announced a desire to 
reduce, or eventually completely abandon U.S. commitments to long-term U.S. allies Ja-
pan and South Korea. However, the recent reaction by U.S. authorities to North Korea’s 
missile tests, which was to launch the first elements of an anti-missile system to South 
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Korea, and president Trump’s confirmation of the United States’s solidarity with Japan 
and South Korea, calmed their allies, signaling that in case of aggression they could 
count on the support of the Americans (Gearan, Morello, 2017).
After taking office, the Trump’s rhetoric has also changed in the context of the U.S. 
intelligence services, which he had severely criticized and disregarded during the elec-
tion campaign, even comparing their actions to the policies of Nazi Germany. However, 
after taking office he stated that he felt safe with the U.S. intelligence services “having 
his back” and that “he supports them 1,000 per cent” (Ackerman, Siddiqui, 2017), which 
at least for now has silenced the debate over an open conflict between the president and 
U.S. intelligence.
Donald Trump’s first 100 days in office failed to answer many of the most press-
ing questions in U.S. foreign and security policy. We still do not know what will be 
the Trump doctrine, whether the United States will in fact focus on internal problems, 
limiting its international role, and whether its domain will be hard or soft power.3 It is 
not surprising that the newly elected president of the United States did not specify the 
basic assumptions of the superpower’s foreign policy within three months of taking of-
fice, as he has changed his views during the election campaign and presented ambigu-
ous, sometimes contradictory proposals. Yet lack of consistency and of a shared position 
between the president and his closest associates cause confusion and anxiety. In such 
important matters for the state, the president’s administration should speak with one 
voice. The question seems to be whether the newly elected U.S. president can count on 
Congress to support his policies? Considering that the Republican Party has a major-
ity in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, implementing the president’s 
policies should theoretically go smoothly, as they are all from the same party. However, 
given that Trump’s statements and campaign slogans aimed directly at the Washington 
establishment, not only the Democratic Party but also the Republican Party, it may turn 
out that the lack of consensus and cohesion among Trump’s closest associates will not be 
the only obstacle to the implementation of president Trump’s U.S. foreign and security 
policy.
The first months of Donald Trump’s government – the most important decisions 
in U.S. foreign and security policy
Since the inauguration of the 45th president of the United States, Donald Trump has 
signed dozens of executive actions, including executive orders, presidential memoranda, 
presidential proclamations and presidential notices of varying importance and scope. 
Some of them are strictly administrative (such as the relocation of individual units). 
Some are Trump’s election promises, but not all are controversial, such as the creation 
of task forces at the Justice Department to fight drug cartels, and to reduce crime and 
attacks on the police. Others cause astonishment, such as the memorandum directing the 
3 Soft power should be understood as “the ability to get what you want through attractiveness rather 
than coercion. It is the result of the attractiveness of the culture and political ideals.” The opposite of 
soft power is hard power, which involves the use of coercive means, especially the military, during 
implementation of foreign policy of the state (see: Nye, 2007, p. 9).
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secretary of defense to draw up a plan within 30 days to defeat “Islamic State”. The sur-
prise comes from the fact that during the election campaign Trump asserted that he had 
a “secret plan for the fight against the Islamic State” (Schmidt, 2017) and even that he 
knew more about “Islamic State” than the generals did (Miller, 2017). But here, Trump’s 
memorandum orders the generals and security advisers of the president to provide him 
with a plan, within a month, to beat the jihadists. It seems that the “secret plan” was one 
of Trump’s electoral slogans, with no basis in reality. What’s more, the initial plans pre-
sented by the Pentagon point to a continuation of Obama administration tactics, the same 
tactics that Trump criticized during his election campaign. The plan is mainly based on 
the continuation of bombing of jihadists’ positions; support for local forces; elimination 
of the sources of funding for terrorists, and the stabilization of areas taken away from 
ISIS (McFadden, Arkin, 2017).
One of Trump’s first decisions was to start the procedure for the withdrawal of the 
United States from the multilateral trade agreement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
signed in October 2015 by twelve countries.4 Acting on the assumption that traditional 
bilateral trade agreements are more beneficial to America, Trump rejected an agreement 
that, according to Barack Obama, would create an economic defense wall against China’s 
growing power. Experts have pointed out that Trump’s decision has begun to transform 
America’s role in the global economy, “leaving an opening for other countries to flex 
their muscles,” which could directly affect the United States and its ability to maintain 
influence and leadership in both economic and political affairs (Mui, 2017).
Another Trump decision concerns one of the flagship slogans of his election cam-
paign, namely the construction of a wall on the border of the United States with Mexico. 
The U.S. president expects that the financial burden (estimated at over $20 billion) will 
be taken up by the Mexican government. The wall is supposed to stop the influx of illegal 
immigrants and drug smugglers into the U.S. (Apuzzo, 2017). During his election cam-
paign, Trump made a number of controversial claims, i.e. that Mexicans are rapists and 
only bring drugs and violence into the U.S., thus provoking indignation among Mexicans 
and Latinos. The statistics of the Federal Bureau of Investigation do not support his 
claims, showing that as the number of illegal immigrants in the United States increased 
from 3 to more than 11 million (1990 to 2013), there was a significant decrease in the 
crime rate by as much as 48%, with fewer recorded robberies, thefts, rapes and murders. 
A similar decrease of 41% could be seen in the number of car thefts and burglaries. This 
discrepancy between statistical data and the president’s statements can also be heard in 
the speeches of former president Truman, who called immigrants from Mexico “out of 
control,” and who also promised to “take our country back.” The Pew Research Center 
reported that the number of illegal immigrants from Mexico living in the United States 
fell by one million to 5.9 million in 2012. In 2010, more Mexicans left the U.S. than 
entered the country. Trump accused Mexicans not only of criminal activity, but also of 
harming the American economy through the relocation of U.S. companies to Mexico 
due to more favorable conditions. Trump used such sharp words as: “they’re killing 
us economically.” The facts, however, are that the GDP of the U.S. is 13 times greater 
than that of Mexico, and the income per capita in the United States is four times that 
4 Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the 
United States and Vietnam.
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of Mexico. More importantly, Mexico is the third largest trading partner with the U.S., 
after Canada and China. And just as Mexico is not able to “kill the U.S. economy,” such 
sharp statements and Trump’s actions can adversely affect relations between the two 
countries. Mexican authorities have already announced they are not going to pay for 
the construction of the wall, calling it a “blatant monument to anti-Mexican hostility” 
(Estevez, 2015).
President Trump’s next decision concerned the withdrawal of federal funds for so 
called “sanctuary cities”, asylum cities whose authorities refused to cooperate with the 
government in prosecuting and deporting illegal immigrants. The list included a few 
hundred cities and counties, including New York and Los Angeles, which, in light of 
Trump’s executive order, provided shelter for undocumented migrants, thereby violating 
U.S. immigration laws. According to statistics, there are more than 11 million illegal 
immigrants in the U.S. at present, and Trump’s order intends to intensify their deporta-
tion. Existing regulations required the deportation of persons who “have committed acts 
that would constitute a chargeable criminal offense” or that an immigration officer has 
judged that such person constitutes a threat to public security. The changes will lead to 
the deportation of people who have no legal documentation and have had any sort of 
interaction with local law enforcement agencies and have been written up. Some say that 
the inclusion of local police in the deportation process will cause illegal immigrants to 
avoid contacting the police even if they need help or wish to report a crime. Opponents 
of the change refer to statistics that indicate that “sanctuary cities” have lower crime 
rates than the national average. They point out that when the police become the gateway 
to deportation, it undermines the principle that the legal system protects everyone (Cam-
eron, 2017). While the president can count on support from the republicans in this case, 
democrats criticize these actions, pointing out that Trump’s tightening of the rules will 
lead to the separation of many families, thereby “turning his back on both our history and 
our values as a proud nation of immigrants” (Laughland, Wong, Siddiqui, 2017).
Another decision made by the U.S. president was to increase the number of border 
guards by an additional 5000. It would seem that this issue would be the least contro-
versial from a security point of view. However, as experts and practitioners point out, 
this decision may not reduce the level of crime, but may even increase it. The reason 
is the difficulty in verifying applicants for the position of a border guard. The latest at-
tempt to increase their numbers did not eliminate those sentenced later for corruption, 
drug trafficking and human trafficking through checkpoints. Statistics show that since 
2004, a total of 197 Customs and Border Protection employees have been arrested and 
sentenced for corruption. Experts point out: “The presence of even one corrupt agent or 
officer deployed at the border has the potential to completely undermine whatever level 
of security has been put in place” (Holpuch, 2017).
Another decision by the U.S. president was to end the practice of what in his election 
campaign Trump called “catch and release.” This refers to the situation where illegal 
immigrants are released after being caught and must wait to be questioned. The release 
is due to the fact that there is not enough room to accommodate everyone at detention 
centers. U.S. immigration authorities can not immediately deport people back to Mexico 
due to humanitarian concerns. Most of the detainees have fled the country due to pov-
erty and violence. Equipped with an electronic bracelet on the ankle they are released 
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pending the date of appearing in an immigration court. Cases take a long time due to 
the fact that many immigrants are asking for asylum. Trump’s executive order obliged 
the secretary of homeland security to check whether immigration laws, which guarantee 
people conditional release or asylum on the basis of fear of persecution in their home 
country, are not being used to block deportation. After the change, the rules would apply 
only to persons with an urgent humanitarian cause or significant social benefits derived 
from such a conditional exemption (Kopan, Shoichet, 2017). Opponents of the change 
are alarmed that the forced detention of all illegal immigrants in the centers will make it 
difficult for them to reach an independent legal counsel and will mean that many of them 
may face deportation without complying with United States legal obligations under the 
UN Refugee Convention (Laughland, 2017).
One of the most controversial decisions made by the new U.S. president, which has 
caused enormous public outrage and protests not only in the United States but around the 
world, has been the ban on entry into the U.S. for travelers who are the citizens of seven 
countries: Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia and Sudan. Trump explained that 
this was intended to prevent “radical Islamic terrorists” from entering the U.S. He added 
that U.S. authorities would agree to accept only those refugees who would “support and 
deeply love the United States.” Priority should be given to Christian refugees and other 
religious minorities over Muslims. Many experts perceive this as religious discrimina-
tion, and therefore a violation of the U.S. Constitution. This order was harshly criticized 
by human rights activists who accused the U.S. president of sanctioned religious per-
secution under cover of security, a “euphemism for discriminating against Muslims” 
(Shear, Cooper, 2017).
The president’s order obliges officials to impose additional checks on refugees “to 
ensure that those approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to the security 
and welfare of the United States.” Trump caused controversy when he referred to the 
September 11, 2001 attacks when announcing the change. The problem was that the 
majority of the 19 aircraft hijackers who destroyed the World Trade Center and Penta-
gon towers came from Saudi Arabia, the rest from the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and 
Lebanon. None of these countries were included in the list of citizens forbidden to enter 
the United States. Some say that the reason for this is that Trump had business contacts 
in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Why did the U.S. presidential 
administration choose these seven states? In the official statement, it was claimed that 
the governments of these countries were “unable or unwilling to provide the information 
we need.” As it turns out, it is of little important that none of the citizens of these banned 
states contributed to the death of even one American as a result of a terrorist attack in the 
United States since 2001(Shear, Cooper, 2017).
Due to the sudden entry into force of the decree, many people were detained at U.S. 
airports. Because of the lack of clarification, the entry ban was also applied to those 
who had already received entry visas into the United States, or initially also to holders 
of Green cards. Despite opposition from the federal appeals court, which blocked the 
decree, arguing that it violated the right to “do justice to the United States Constitution,” 
Donald Trump questioned and criticized the judge’s opinion, calling it “ridiculous”, de-
claring at the same time that he will appeal the decision. Experts claim that the United 
States is currently facing a constitutional crisis. “This is an epic confrontation between 
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the presidency and the constitution,” and the disrespectful nature of the president’s ap-
proach to legislation is very dangerous, since it can lead to chaos in the state (Walters, 
2017).
Eventually, the president issued a new executive order, which banned the entry into 
the United States from the six countries listed in the previous list, excluding Iraq. The 
decision was explained as a result of collaboration between the United States and Iraq in 
combating the “Islamic State,” and an agreement with the Iraqi government, which had 
pledged to increase cooperation with America in the verification of Iraqi applicants to 
the United States. Permanent residents and current visa holders were excluded from the 
ban. Also, a complete ban on refugee entry from Syria was removed and replaced with 
a 120-day suspended entry period required for verification and renewal. A record from 
the previous document was kept, which reduced the number of refugees admitted to the 
U.S. each year from 110,000 to 50,000 (Thrush, 2017). Trump’s second order was also 
blocked by a district court judge who accused him of discriminating against Muslims, 
stressing: “We can not fault the president for being politically incorrect, but we do fault 
him for being constitutionally incorrect” (Hawaii judge).
In the context of Trump’s electoral statements regarding the limited (conditional) 
involvement of the United States in solving international problems, his rapid decision 
of April 7, 2017 to bomb Syrian Air Force al-Shajrat was quite a surprise. This was in 
response to the use of chemical weapons against civilians on April 4, 2017, where at least 
86 people were killed, for which Trump’s administration unequivocally accused Bashar 
al-Assad’s regime. The quick reaction of the American president may be surprising given 
that this decision was not made within the framework of the UN, after an investigation 
and the explicit exclusion of other options. His predecessor – Barack Obama – was in 
a similar situation in 2013, when more than 1,400 people were killed as a result of the 
use of chemical weapons in Ghouta near Damascus. However, Obama decided not to re-
spond with a military attack. Instead, he chose the diplomatic route, which resulted in the 
Syrian president’s commitment to liquidate the Syrian chemical arsenal. The entire arse-
nal was to be liquidated by the end of June 2014. Despite assurances from the Pentagon 
that Russian forces were warned about plans to bomb the base in Syria, the Kremlin’s 
reaction was unequivocally critical of U.S. activities, calling them “aggression against 
a sovereign nation,” which could consequently lead to a halt in military cooperation 
between Russia and the U.S. in Syria and seriously undermine relations between the two 
countries. All the more so since the Russian government called the chemical attack in 
Syria a “provocation” by rebels fighting with Assad, thereby denying the Syrian govern-
ment’s participation in it (see: Sengupta, Macfarquhar, Steinhauer, 2017).
It is worth pointing out that the bombing of the Syrian base was the first direct U.S. 
attack on the Bashar el-Assad regime since the beginning of the six-year war in Syria. 
Trump’s decision may seem surprising when compared to his earlier pro-Russian stance, 
at the same time raising many questions about further U.S. military engagement in Syria: 
will there be an intensification of attacks or was the bombing a one-off project? Whether 
strong or weak, Russia’s response to U.S. actions, which can be seen in terms of a trial of 
strength, will have significant consequences and affect Russia’s position in the interna-
tional system. All the more so since the American administration informed the Russian 
authorities that they must choose whose side they wish to be on in the Syrian conflict, 
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while announcing the approaching end of the Assad regime. Thus Trump’s decision rais-
es questions about further relations on the Washington-Moscow line.
The decision-making process at the White House is also brought into question, given 
the impression that Trump’s decision to bombard Syria seemed to have been made im-
petuously, without much reflection, calculation or analysis of possible repercussions. 
And as some researchers and journalists point out, “the emotional president is easily ma-
nipulated” (Milewski, 2017). In this context one might wonder whether Trump’s decision 
was influenced by his closest associates whose approach to the Kremlin’s policies differ 
significantly from that of the president of the United States. Perhaps Trump wanted to 
minimize criticism from Congress, including the republicans, who accused him of a pas-
sive stance on the Syrian conflict. Perhaps in a symbolic way Trump also wanted to end 
suspicions of Russian influence on the White House. Perhaps it was a show of strength, 
independence and determination by the superpower leader. Perhaps he wanted to show 
that, unlike Barack Obama, who in 2012 drew a “red line” against the use of chemical 
weapons, after which the U.S. was to react strongly to the Assad regime, yet in reality 
showed a passive attitude, Trump will react immediately to provocation. No matter the 
impetus for this decision, the U.S. president once again surprised the international com-
munity, raising even more doubts and questions about what the Trump doctrine will be.
The implications of Donald Trump’s foreign and security policy for the United 
States – conclusions
One of the most important questions in the context of recent changes in U.S. foreign 
and security policy is: is America more secure today? Although Trump’s most controver-
sial order banning entry to the United States for the citizens of six Muslim countries has 
been blocked by law, the president’s administration has not given up and is fighting for 
new legislation. The question seems to be: will the ban on entry into the United States 
increase the security of the superpower, protecting Americans from further terrorist at-
tacks? According to reports from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and State 
Department, the answer is: not necessarily. This is due to the fact that citizenship is an 
“unlikely indicator” of a terrorist threat to the United States. Statistics show that few 
people from these states have been involved in terrorist activities in the United States 
since the civil war started in Syria in 2011. As pointed out in the report of 82 people who, 
according to the government, were influenced by a foreign terrorist group to conduct or 
attempt to attack on an area in the U.S., more than half were U.S. citizens, born in the 
United States. The rest came from Pakistan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iraq 
and Uzbekistan. One person from Iran, Sudan and Yemen each was involved in terrorist 
activities. None were from Syria, whose citizens are now completely banned from enter-
ing the U.S. The report emphasized that terrorist organizations in Iran, Libya, Somalia 
and Sudan are focused on their own regions, while groups in Iraq, Syria and Yemen pose 
a threat to the United States (Salama, Caldwell, 2017; Country Reports on Terrorism 
2015).
Another important question in the context of the Trump ban is: can it lead to an 
increase in attacks on the U.S.? Even in the ranks of the republicans, Trump’s decision 
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alarmed many who believed it was a great propaganda boost for the “Islamic State,” 
which, in the name of injustice, by announcing anti-American slogans, could recruit 
new members to the organization and motivate them to attack the United States (Yu-
has, 2017). The order concerns six nationalities, and covers all professional and social 
groups, including academics, students, doctors, and specialists, who came to the United 
States in search of a “better life” (Dehghan, 2017). Separation of families, and “pigeon-
holing” people of certain nationalities or religions as potential terrorists, may prove to be 
counterproductive, and lead to trauma and hostility towards people of different ethnici-
ties. This may result in the radicalization of various people living in the United States, 
who otherwise would not have thought about committing acts of terror. Trump’s deci-
sions are plagued by rhetoric which reinforce the propaganda of the “Islamic State,” 
which falsely claim that the United States is at war with Islam (Loffredo, 2017). Closing 
doors for refugees to the United States may weaken the nation’s ability to lead the world, 
for they are turning away from the problems of their allies. This has a destabilization 
effect on allies’ security. The paradox of the situation is that the U.S. government, and 
specifically the administration of president George W. Bush, led to the emergence of an 
“Islamic State” (Waśko-Owsiejczuk, 2017, pp. 7–31), destabilizing the entire region and 
triggering a wave of refugees, and now the new president has made a decision to turn 
away from the problem the U.S. created themselves.
The closing of borders or building walls on the border with Mexico will not solve 
the problem of crime in the United States, but will certainly affect the deterioration of 
relations between states. Employing an additional 5,000 border guards will not eliminate 
the problem of corruption which allows drug trafficking and human trafficking to be 
conducted among the U.S.-Mexican border. An outline of Trump’s doctrine illustrates 
another face of America, one which renounces international obligations and pursues uni-
lateral politics in the name of Trump’s “America first.” In a narrower perspective, with-
drawing from international agreements and commitments may strengthen the position 
of the United States, which, as a superpower, will be able to dictate their conditions to 
others; but in a broader perspective, this will only weaken U.S. allies while strengthening 
their enemies. After World War II, the United States, as the strongest and most influential 
member of the United Nations and NATO, became the guarantor of international secu-
rity. The introduction of a business system in the operation of these organizations, where 
a reaction to aggression will depend on the contributions paid, will only accelerate the 
erosion of the collective security system. Trump’s view of foreign policy seems to be 
very short-sighted, in believing that cutting the U.S. off from the rest of the world will 
bring it security and prosperity. In times of the “global village,” the problems of Europe 
or the Middle East are also the problems of the U.S. Without international cooperation, 
no nation can feel safe today.
On the one hand, Trump’s recent decision to bomb the Syrian base may be a signal 
of reassurance to the international community that the superpower will react to the use 
of chemical weapons against civilian populations and defend human rights. On the other 
hand, the decision may be a cause of concern, since it was made outside the international 
framework, without consultation with the United Nations. Although welcomed by many 
world leaders as an adequate response to the use of forbidden chemical weapons, the 
bombing of the Syrian base by the Americans was imperious, and denounced by Rus-
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sian authorities as illegal, in violation of UN law. Remembering the aggressive politics 
of George W. Bush’s administration, which was characterized by an illegal invasion of 
Iraq, the Russians are alarmed that the scenario may be repeated and the Americans may 
return to unilateral and imperious actions (see: Savage, 2017).
Trump is changing the face of America not only in terms of its international, but also 
its internal, approach. In less than 100 days after the takeover of power, the United States 
is heading for a constitutional crisis in which a clash between the executive and the judi-
ciary branches could affect the entire political system of the state. What is troubling are 
the attacks on judicial independence and disregard for judicial power, which is a peculiar 
position for the president of a superpower to take. Also unsettling are the president’s 
opinions about the power of the president, the division of power, respect for the Con-
stitution, and the principle of checks and balances, which is supposed to be a deterrent 
mechanism to control executive power. Trump’s first decisions seem to confirm the fears 
cited after his victory that the first U.S. president without any political experience may 
have problems managing the state. It seems that Donald Trump forgets that superpower 
management is not the same as the management of a company, where any word of criti-
cism can cause the dismissal of an employee. America has repeatedly experienced that 
the use of soft power is a much more useful tool than the use of hard power. But diplo-
macy does not seem to be a strength of the new U.S. president, who openly declares that 
he supports torture as an effective tool for combating terrorism, despite the fact that the 
2014 Senate Intelligence Commission Report claimed that torture victims provided false 
testimony and Osama Bin Laden’s hideout was discovered through traditional intelli-
gence (eavesdropping) and not through torture (Waśko-Owsiejczuk, 2016a).
Trump undoubtedly wants to rule with a hard hand, changing the face of America 
to one that closes and isolates itself from its allies, and bases its actions, including its 
response to aggression, on money and not on values or the law; which as a country built 
by immigrants closes its doors to them, including such injured and vulnerable groups as 
refugees; where executive power disregards the powers of the courts and trivializes its 
decisions. In this way Donald Trump will not strengthen America, but will only weaken 
it. Ruling a superpower requires deliberation, and Trump’s first decisions may be proof 
that deliberation will not be the main feature of his presidency, but rather governance 
through unpredictability and short-sightedness.
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Czy Ameryka jest teraz bezpieczniejsza? O pierwszych zmianach w polityce zagranicznej  
i bezpieczeństwa USA za prezydentury Donalda Trumpa 
 
Streszczenie
Artykuł opisuje pierwsze miesiące prezydentury Donalda Trumpa. Przedstawia jego najważniejsze 
decyzje w zakresie polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa USA, głosy krytyczne i wspierające oraz 
ewentualne implikacje dla bezpieczeństwa USA.
Już podczas kampanii wyborczej niektóre propozycje Trumpa wywoływały niepokój społeczności 
międzynarodowej i wiele pytań w kontekście dotychczasowych sojuszy. Zapowiedział m.in. wpro-
wadzenie rygorystycznych przepisów w prawie emigracyjnym, niezwłoczną deportację nielegalnych 
imigrantów z USA, przywróceniem tortur jako narzędzia walki z terrorystami, podważał ponadto do-
tychczasową politykę współpracy z sojusznikami, kwestionując dążenie do zapewniania bezpieczeń-
stwa innym krajom na koszt USA. Podjęte podczas pierwszych 100 dni urzędowania Donalda Trumpa 
decyzje wpływają nie tylko na sytuację wewnętrzną USA, zarówno w kontekście bezpieczeństwa kraju, 
jak i systemu politycznego, ze względu na rodzący się kryzys konstytucyjny i tarcia pomiędzy władzą 
wykonawczą i sądowniczą. Jego decyzje wpływają również na stosunki pomiędzy USA i ich sojusz-
nikami oraz przekształcają rolę Stanów Zjednoczonych w świecie i wpływ supermocarstwa na system 
zbiorowego bezpieczeństwa.
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